

National Biodefense Strategy Calls for a Robust Decontamination Capability



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Center for Environmental Solutions and Emergency Response

International Decon Conference
November 19, 20219





oats and Soda

Russian Lab Explosion Raises Question: Should Smallpox Virus Be Kept Or Destroyed?

September 19, 2019

FRAN KRITZ



BUSINESS INSIDER

CDC Says It Just Discovered Vials Identified As Smallpox At A Lab In Maryland

Kevin Loria Jul 8, 2014, 1:27 PM

On July 1, workers at the National Institutes of Health notified the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that they discovered vials containing smallpox in a cold storage room of a Food and Drug Administration lab on the NIH Bethesda campus.

Because it's so infectious




An Israeli nurse holds a vial of smallpox vaccine in 2002. People in the United States haven't received a vaccine for



Los Angeles Times


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Op-Ed: Ebola lapses show lab safety protocols should factor in human error



A single coordinated effort to orchestrate the full range of activities that needs to be carried out to address biological incidents, whether deliberate, naturally occurring, or accidental in origin.

“All of Community” Approach to Biodefense



US National Biodefense Strategy calls for a Robust Decontamination Capability



Coordination

Cooperation

Collaboration

Prepare (NBS Goal 3)

- Conduct research to understand the persistence and potential for secondary transmission of biological contaminants in a variety of environments and the ability of various disinfection technologies to inactivate or remove biological contaminants.
- Develop and verify technologies for all phases of environmental cleanup that address various types of infrastructure, equipment, and environments.
- Develop readily available and scalable technologies and software tools to support water and wastewater infrastructure decontamination and the treatment of contaminated water.
- Develop and verify plans for all phases of environmental cleanup for facilities, equipment, and the environment through drills and exercises that incorporate relevant partners and stakeholders.
- Establish pre-incident decontamination and waste management recommendations for:
 - Impacted community members, patients, and response personnel;
 - Contaminated drinking water;
 - Waste collection, handling, and packaging methods suitable for waste transport (including interstate transport), temporary storage, off-site treatment, and disposal;
 - Handling and disposition of human remains;
 - Disposition of animal remains; and
 - Environmental decontamination practices, as warranted.

DECON

Capability
and
Capacity



Respond (NBS Goal 4)

- Conduct decontamination operations and the management of waste and contaminated materials in a manner that is protective of human, animal, and plant health, the environment, and the economy

Recover (NBS Goal 5)

- Address the loss of critical infrastructure capability and capacity as quickly as possible to limit cascading effects by working with owners and operators, SLTT entities, and international partners, as appropriate.
- Support restoration of critical infrastructure in addition to continued performance of National Essential Functions through recovery of the federal, military, local first responders, and other critical workforces.

Basic Phases of Response and Recovery to a Biological Incident

| Response and Recovery* | | | | | |
|--|---|--|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| Crisis Management | | Consequence Management | | | |
| Notification | First Response | Remediation/Cleanup | | | Restoration/ Reoccupancy |
| | | Characterization | Decontamination | Clearance | |
| Receive information on biological incident | Initial threat assessment | Characterization of biological agent | Decontamination strategy | Clearance environmental sampling and analysis | Renovation |
| Identification of suspect release sites | HAZMAT and emergency actions | Characterization of affected site | Remediation Action Plan | Clearance decision | Reoccupation decision |
| Notification of appropriate agencies | Forensic investigation | Site containment | Worker health and safety | | Long-term environmental and public health monitoring |
| | Public health actions | Continue risk communication | Site preparation | | |
| | Screening sampling | Characterization environmental sampling and analysis | Source reduction | | |
| | Determination of agent type, concentration, and viability | Initial risk assessment | Waste disposal | | |
| | Risk communication | Clearance goals | Decontamination of sites or items | | |
| | | | Decontamination verification | | |
| * The optimization decision process is applicable to any phase | | | | | |



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509 NAT. SENATE OFFICE
BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20540-1111

TOM BROKAW
NBC TV
30 ROCKEFELLER
NEW YORK, NY

09-11-01
I CAN NOT STOP US
I HAVE THIS ANTHRAX
YOU DIE NOW
ARE YOU ASHAMED?
DEATH TO AMERICA
ISRAEL IS GREAT

09-11-01
THIS IS NEXT
TAKE PENICILIN NOW
DEATH TO AMERICA
DEATH TO ISRAEL
ALLAH IS GREAT

“Responding and Recovering” from Outbreaks




SMALLPOX



TYPHOID



The Milwaukee Outbreak



AIDS



MEASLES



ZIKA




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
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CHOLERA



LEPROSY



Antiquity Middle Ages Modern Era Today What's Next?






Justian

Black Death

PLAGUE




3rd Plague



EBOLA



ASF



SARS



MERS



How and why do disease outbreaks occur?

- People on the move
- Living closer together
- Changing the land
- Animal relationships
- Infrastructure Failure
- Lab Accidents
- Bioterrorism



“Responding and Recovering” from Outbreaks




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


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
Spanish Influenza has endangered the prosecution of the WAR in Europe. There are cases in the Navy Yard 30 deaths have already resulted SPITTING SPREADS SPANISH INFLUENZA DONT SPIT



CHOLERA



LEPROSY



The Ten Plagues of Egypt

Antiquity Middle Ages Modern Era Today What's Next?





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
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EBOLA




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MERS








Plague-infested homes (China, 1890s)







Plague-infested homes (Honolulu, 1900)



Great Fire of London, 1666



Burning FMDV carcasses (Wales, 2001)





Integrated Vector Control Approach Mosquito Control Measures

Anti-larval Measures

- Environmental control
- Chemical control
- Biological Control

Anti Adult Measures

- Space Sprays
- Residual Sprays
- Genetic Control

Protect Against Mosquito Bites

- Mosquito Nets
- Screening
- Repellents

Legislative Control

- Civic Laws
- Regulations

INTEGRATED MOSQUITO MANAGEMENT


A comprehensive Integrated Mosquito Management program includes four steps:



1. SAMPLING
Monitor Populations



2. SOURCE REDUCTION
Remove Standing Water



3. BIOLOGICAL CONTROL
Use Natural Mosquito Predators




4. PRODUCT APPLICATION
Use larvicides and adulticides



[arpestcor](http://arpestcor.com)

HOW OXITEC MOSQUITO BREEDING WORKS



ONLY **3-5%** OF OFFSPRING
WILL INITIALLY SURVIVE



THE PLAGUE IN PENSACOLA AND ITS EXTERMINATION

The Dreaded "Bubonic Plague"
Has Appeared In Pensacola
THE FEDERAL, STATE AND CITY HEALTH AUTHORITIES
ARE FIGHTING THIS DISEASE FOR YOUR BENEFIT

**To Insure Success, Your
Co-operation Is Imperative**

This Plague is primarily a disease of the Rat.
The infection is transmitted by the Flea.
The Flea living on the infected Rat becomes infected.
If the infected Flea bites a human being, that person becomes
infected with the Plague.
It is incumbent upon all to wage a relentless war on the Rat.

YOUR DUTY:

Trap Rats!
Obey the Sanitary Laws of the City!
Have your Premises Inspected!

CITIZENS' HEALTH COMMITTEE

| | | |
|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Robert F. Shaw | H. H. McAlister | R. F. Rogers |
| Frank Riera | J. H. Chiles | J. A. White |
| E. D. Rogers | H. V. Hendon | L. L. Feltch |
| A. H. Cook | B. L. Conderman | O. J. Semmes |

A TALE OF TWO CITIES

AND HOW THEY DEALT WITH THE PLAGUE

APRIL 6, 1900
PRICE: 5c
VOL. 6

PLAGUE HITS SAN FRANCISCO

POLITICS, ECONOMICS, RACISM

Merle Rosenzweig, Anna Cupito, Elise Wescom, Chase Masters

1. On the wharves, San Francisco, 1900.

2. Joseph James Kinyoun MD: Central to the discovery of the San Francisco plague of 1900-1904

3. Plague Commissioners. Photograph taken during commissioner "bureau" meeting on February 4th, 1901. From left: Lewellys Barker, Simon Flexner, Frederick Novy.

4. Frederick Novy: Showed plague was present by performing fluid aspirated from the spleen of the deceased patient, Wong Chi Lin.

5. Page from Novy's laboratory notebook.

6. Receiving Station set up as part of the War on Rats led by the U.S. Public Health Service.

7. Rat Dissection.

8. Hiding the Sick.

9. Fighting the Plague in San Francisco.

11. San Francisco's Chinatown with barbed wire fences circa 1900.

SAN FRANCISCO QUARANTINE
Policeman Keep Guards Around Chinese District Against Plague
SAN FRANCISCO, May 30.—The quarantine officers here today are keeping a close watch on the Chinese district, which is now being isolated by barbed wire fences. The Chinese are being kept out of the district, and the Chinese are being kept out of the district. The Chinese are being kept out of the district, and the Chinese are being kept out of the district.

10. San Francisco Quarantine. May 30, 1900.

OFFICIAL REPORT UPON THE PLAGUE IN SAN FRANCISCO

12. Official Report Upon the Plague in San Francisco, the Pacific commercial advertiser, April 17, 1901.

The Call.
BOARD OF HEALTH CONFESSES TO A FAMOUS EXPERT THAT THERE IS NO BUBONIC PLAGUE IN THIS CITY

13. The San Francisco Call. May 29th, 1900.






How and why do disease outbreaks occur?

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- Lab Accidents
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Figure 4: Sites around the World that Received Viable *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax) Samples from 2004 through 2015 Thought to be Inactivated from the Department of Defense's Dugway Proving Ground



Source: GAO analysis of information from the Department of Defense and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. | GAO-16-642

Infrastructure Failures

Screenshot: Nov 11, 2019; 4:30pm

WATERMAIN *BREAK* CLOCK.COM
Corrosion is not Sustainable

Sign Up for Our Email Alerts: *

[SIGN UP](#)

[Contact Us](#)



Each day, 850 water main breaks occur in North America. Since January 2000, we have suffered:


6,165,611 *BROKEN* WATER MAINS (INCLUDING **561** SO FAR TODAY),


\$61,656,114,765 IN WATER MAIN *REPAIR COSTS*.

According to a 2002 congressional study, corrosion costs U.S. water and waste water systems over \$50.7 billion annually. Since January 2000, the price tag for this epidemic in the United States is:

\$801,672,349,228 IN TOTAL *CORROSION COSTS*.

Deficiencies Linked to Drinking Water-Associated Outbreaks, 2013-14; CDC (2017)





US National Biodefense Strategy

ASSESS PREVENT PREPARE RESPOND RECOVER

National Biodefense Strategy Calls for a Robust Decontamination Capability



For more information:

<https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/biodefense-strategy/>